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"..: 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
JAMES & JACKSON LLC, individually and ) 
derivatively on behalf of MBC, GOSPEL ) 
NETWORK, LLC., ) 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EVANDER HOLYFIELD, JR., WILLIE E. 
GARY, CECIL FIELDER, LORENZO 
WILLIAMS, THOMAS WEIKSNAR, CHAN 
ABNEY, LORI METOYER-BROWN, and 
RICK NEWBERGER, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Civil Action No.: 2006CV124372 
FILE IN OFFICE 
MAY 072009 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY GA 
ORDER ON MOTION TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF ROBERT GRAY 
On April 13, 2009, the parties appeared before this Court on Defendants' Motion 
in Limine to Exclude the Testimony of Robert Gray ("Gray"), Plaintiff's damages and 
valuation expert prepared to testify about the value of MBC, as well as to provide a 
critique of the Shannon Pratt valuation relied upon by Defendants. After reviewing the 
briefs of the parties, Gray's report and his deposition, the record of the case, and the 
arguments presented by counsel, the Court finds as follows: 
FACTS 
This case involves a dispute arising from an April 2006, cash-out merger of MBC 
Gospel Network, LLC ("MBC"), a Delaware limited liability company, into Programming 
Acquisitions ("Programming"), also a Delaware limited liability company. 
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Plaintiff James and Jackson LLC ("J&J") was a founding member and twenty 
percent (20%) member of MBC. Willie Gary, LLC ('WGLLC") was the controlling, and 
only other member of MBC, with eighty percent (80%) interest.1 
In 2005, WGLLC filed suit in Delaware Chancery Court to compel J&J's consent 
to the addition of a third member, or, in the alternative, to dissolve MBC. Chancellor 
Strine found that the MBC Operating Agreement did not condition the withholding of 
consent on reasonableness, and thus, the Delaware Court could not compel J&J's 
consent. Thereafter, the parties discussed dissolution of MBC. WGLLC, however, 
withdrew the petition prior to a final order or other action in the case. 
In April 2006, WGLLC formed Programming, the entity into which MBC merged. 
WGLLC has several members including Defendants Evander Holyfield, Jr., Willie E. 
Gary, Cecil Fielder, Lorenzo Williams, Chan Abney, and Lori Metoyer Brown, all of 
whom were on the Management Board of MBC. In addition, Defendant Rick 
Newberger was the CEO of MBC and became the CEO of Programming. Defendant 
Thomas Weiksnar was on the Management Board of MBC, served as counsel for 
WGLLC, and became the Secretary of Programming. On April 26, 2006, Programming 
and MBC finalized a $1 cash-out merger. 
On April 30, 2007, Gospel Music Channel LLC (HGMC") purchased Programming 
for $10 million, plus 2.943 million shares, as well as an equity bonus contingent upon a 
certain liquidity event, in exchange for the assignment by Programming to GMC of all of 
Programming's right, title and interest under Programming's (formerly MBC's) satellite 
1 The parties represent that J&J held a 20% interest and WGLLC held an 80% interest 
in MBC, although careful review of the record shows that WGLLC granted MBC CEO 
Rick Newberger a 3% interest in MBC, which Newberger held at the time of the merger. 
After the merger, Newberger became CEO of Programming, but held no interest in 
Programming. 
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distribution agreement with HITS (a Colorado corporation). The shareholders of 
Programming executing that transaction were Cecil Fielder, Willie Gary, Evander 
Holyfield, Lorenzo Williams and Maria Sperando (who was listed, but did not execute 
the agreement). All had previously been shareholders of WGLLC. 
Plaintiff complains that the merger was a self-interested transaction and raises 
several direct and derivative claims of breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting, and 
conspiracy of breach of fiduciary duty. 
THE DAUBERT STANDARD 
In 2005, the Georgia General Assembly adopted O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1, which 
requires a trial court to apply the federal Daubert rule in assessing the admissibility of 
expert testimony; therefore federal authority, as well as Georgia law, is relevant to the 
question of admissibility. See, Mason v. Home Depot U.S.A., 283 Ga. 271 (2008). 
Pursuant to both O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1 and Daubert, once a court determines that 
"scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact," an 
expert may give opinion testimony so long as such testimony is reliable and relevant. 
O.C.G.A. §24-9-67.1; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-
595 (1993). O.C.G.A § 24-9-67.1 defines reliable and relevant factors as testimony that 
is based upon sufficient facts or data, is the product of reliable methods, and is the 
product of a reliable application of the methods to the facts of the case. 
The Daubert standard is liberal and favors admissibility. See, e.g., KSP 
Investments, Inc. v. U.S., 2008 WL 182260 (N.D. OH 2008) ("As commentators have 
noted, Rule 702 evinces a liberal approach regarding admissibility of expert testimony. 
Under this liberal approach, expert testimony is presumptively admissible."); In re Scrap 
Metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 530 (2008) ("[R]ejection of expert testimony is 
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the exception, rather than the rule."); see also, Mason, 283 Ga. at 279 (holding that it is 
"proper to consider and give weight to constructions placed on the federal rules by 
federal courts when applying or construing" D.C.G.A. § 24-7-67.1 because the Georgia 
statute was based upon Rule 702 and Daubert). The burden to establish admissibility 
falls upon Plaintiffs as the proffering parties. Netquote, Inc. v. Byrd, 2008WL 2442048, 
at *6 (D. Colo. 2008). In a Daubert inquiry, the trial court acts as a "gatekeeper" in 
determining whether the expert is qualified to testify. See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. 
McDowell, 2008 WL 5050020 (Ga. App. 2008). 
THE DAUBERT ANALYSIS 
A. Qualification of Mr. Gray 
Defendants do not contend that Gray is not qualified to serve as a damages and 
valuation expert in this case. They do, however, challenge his use of a calculation 
engagement rather than a valuation engagement to value the minority shareholder's 
interest here, and they allege that Gray, contrary to Delaware law, also employed 
reductions for lack of control or marketability of shares in calculating the value of the 
minority shareholder interest. Defendants also argue that Gray improperly raised the 
level of valuation service he provided from a calculation engagement to a valuation 
engagement, thus generating new opinions for J&J's 20% interest after the expert's 
deposition. 
Defendants further contend that: 1) Gray's reclassification of $28.76 million in 
liabilities to equity was not permitted under the ARDA; 2) certain of Gray's disclaimers 
demonstrate the unreliability of the valuation he performed; 3) Gray he did not consider 
bankruptcy as one of his valuation scenarios, and 4) Gray failed to perform a truly 
independent analysis to ascertain the fair value of MBC. 
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B. Reliability and Relevance of Mr. Gray's Opinion 
1. Calculation Engagement 
Defendants challenge the admissibility of Gray's testimony on the grounds that 
he based his opinion of the value of MBC on a calculation engagement which is only a 
subjective engagement to estimate value and, as such, is subjective, speculative and 
imprecise. Thus, Defendants argue that the calculation value method does not provide 
a conclusive estimate of value upon which jurors can rely. However, Defendants also 
argue that it was improper for Gray to raise the level of valuation service he provided 
from a calculation engagement to a valuation engagement in a supplemental valuation 
filed via affidavit on January 20, 2009. 
In Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court "broadened the process for 
determining the 'fair value' of the company's outstanding shares by including all 
generally accepted techniques of valuation used in the financial community." Paskill 
Corp. v. Alcoma Corp., 747 A.2d 549, 556 (Del. 2000). The Court took "a more liberal 
approach [relying on] proof of value by any techniques or methods which are generally 
considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise admissible in court," 
subject only to its interpretation. Weinberger v. U.O.P., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
Choices about valuation methodology have not been restricted by the Delaware 
legislature or Delaware courts, with such choices made on a case-by-case basis by the 
fact-finder, although discounts and control premiums are not allowed. 
Pretermitting any discussion of whether a calculation value method is reliable in 
this case, Gary has submitted Supplemental Estimated Conclusions of Fair Value for 
J&J's Subject Interest, pursuant to his performance of a valuation engagement, which 
yielded a higher company value. Defendants point to the discrepancy between the 
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calculation engagement and the valuation as evidence that the calculation engagement 
method is unreliable in this case. Mr. Gray's use of the calculation engagement method 
alone is not sufficient grounds to bar his testimony regarding the value of MBC at the 
,time of the Programming merger. The price discrepancy between the two estimates is 
best addressed through cross examination. 
2. Recalculated Opinions Pursuant to a Valuation Engagement 
Defendants also challenge Gray's valuation engagement because they say he 
lacked critical information, such as a solvency analysis of MBC, or whether MBC would 
have qualified for bankruptcy reorganization. 
MBC, however, was not in bankruptcy. In fact, bankruptcy is an option that 
Defendants refused to take preferring instead to pursue the merger with Programming. 
Additionally, under Delaware law post-merger valuations, although often performed in 
the context of a statutory appraisal, are performed as a "going concern." See, ~, 
Highfields Capital, Ltd., v. AXA Financial, 939 A.3d 34 (Del. Ch. 2007); Mercier v. Inter-
Tel (Delaware), Inc., 929 A.2d 786 (Del. Ch. 2007). Finally, such concerns are best 
addressed via cross examination rather than a bar to testimony. 
3. Minority Shareholder Discount 
Defendants attack the reliability of Gray's testimony on the grounds that Gray 
used reductions for lack of control or marketability of shares in calculating the value of 
the minority shareholder interest, which is forbidden. "In Bancorporation, [the Delaware 
Supreme Court] once again held that, after the entire corporation has been valued as a 
going concern by applying an appraisal methodology that passes judicial muster, there 
can be no discounting at the shareholder level." Paskill, 747 A.2d 549, 557. Mr. Gray, 
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however, provided two numbers: one with the discount and another without. Prior to 
the start of the trial, Defendants may move the court in limine to exclude Mr. Gray's 
testimony regarding the value that reflects the minority discount, as such discounts are 
contrary to Delaware law. The inclusion of such a discount does not warrant the 
exclusion of Mr. Gray's testimony under the Daubert standard. 
4. Specific Elements of the Valuation 
a) Reclassification of MBC loans as equity 
Defendants challenge the admissibility of Mr. Gray's testimony on the grounds 
that he improperly classified MBC's loans as equity in MBC. This is a question of law to 
be determined by the Court at a later time. Since this issue is not yet resolved in favor 
of either Plaintiffs or Defendants, it is appropriate that Mr. Gray's valuation included an 
estimate based upon the classification of the money under one scenario as a loan and 
under another as equity. 
b) Gray's disclaimers and independent 
Defendants challenge the admissibility of Mr. Gray's testimony on the grounds 
that he is not independent and provided disclaimers which undermine the reliability of 
his valuation. The Court finds nothing in the record to suggest that these issues are not 
best dealt with through cross examination. 
C. Assisting the Trier of Fact. 
Defendants assert that Gray's opinions will not assist the trier of fact because 
Gray does not profess to have performed a valuation to determine the fair value of 
those holding interest in MBC at the time of the merger. The valuations performed by 
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Gray as of the time of oral argument on this motion, including the valuation 
engagement, are sufficiently assistive and shall not be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants raise significant challenges to the facts, assumptions, explanations, 
and choices Gray made in conducting his evaluation and rendering his expert opinion. 
"Whether those explanations will withstand rigorous cross-examination, or challenges 
based on alternative assumptions or data choices, is not the issue now before the 
Court." In re Scrap metal Antitrust Litigation, 527 F.3d 517, 527 (2008). Accordingly, 
the Court finds that Gray is qualified as an expert and that his opinion testimony is both 
reliable and relevant. See,~, id. at 529 ("[A] determination that proffered expert 
testimony is reliable does not indicate, in any way, the correctness or truthfulness of 
such an opinion."). Defendants' Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Robert Gray is 
hereby DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this _(-=----_ day of ~ ,2009. 
ALICE D. BONNER, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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Jerry A. Landers, Jr. 
GREEN JOHNSON & LANDERS LLP 
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